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FACTORS ::rFL'JEMC:N'G JI'/EoTMENT DECISION-MAKING:
IVIDSMCE ?RCM A FIELD STUDY
S'JMMARY
This research invescigates factors which influenced Che corporace-
level divestment decisions of large, diversified firms. Field research,
including interviews vich corporate executives of
_40_ large diversified
firms, provided the data to test propositions developed from various
literature sources. In general, the findings from this research indi-
cate that a business unit's strength, its relationship to other units in
its firm, and its parent firm's financial position compared to its com-
petitors are important divestment influences, while other factors such
as general economic conditions are not. Some of our findings are con-
sistent with conventional management wisdom; others are counterintuitive.

INTRODUCTION
CorporaCa divesc.uent ;an be ierined as a fir:n's decision to dispose
of a significant por-ioa sf its assets. This research studied the fac-
tors which contributed to divestaent decisions by large diversified
firms. For our purposes, divestments consisted of whole business units
or divisions of these firms.
Although there are -aany examples in the contemporary business press
of corporate divestments involving significant financial losses for the
divesting firms, there are also reports of divestments which produce
profits for the divesting firms, even in the short term. Some firms
have been able to make profitable divestments as the result of volun-
tary strategic choices. It is therefore important for researchers and
managers to understand the factors influencing corporate divestment
decision-making. This understanding should enable firms to manage
their internal operations and influence their external environments so
as to increase the probability that their divestments will be voluntary
and profitable, rather than mandatory and financially unfavorable.
The assumption is frequently made that business unit unprofitabil-
ity is the primary factor which prompts a firm's decision to divest.
This research addresses the nature and strength of other decision-
influencing factors as well. It provides evidence concerning the ef-
fects of certain economic, behavioral, and business portfolio factors
on divestment decisions.
Personal interviews with executives of forty Fortune 500 firms pro-
vided the primary data for this research. In addition, published
sources provided data on some of the research variables. Non-parametric
statistical taethods were used to test the research hypotheses.
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'
'' RELATED LITERATURE
Several branches of management literature provided valuable in-
sights during the formulation of this research. The relevant areas
include those related to strategic decisions and the decision-making
processes which produce them, life cycle theory and endgame strategies,
stages of corporate development, corporate portfolio theory, and the
limited prior work on corporate divestments. The most important con-
tributions from these literatures provide the basis for this research
and thus deserve our initial attention.
Strategic Decisions and Processes
A review of the management literature, and in particular of that
related to business policy, indicates the prominence of strategy as a
central organizing concept (Chandler, 1962; Ansoff, 1965; Andrews, 1971;
Hofer and Schendel, 1978; Grant and King, 1982). In view of the pro-
liferation of diversification as a strategy and divisionalization as a
structure (Rumelt, 1974), the distinction between corporate-level and
business-level strategies is especially relevant.* Corporate strategy,
with its emphasis on managing the composition of and shifts in port-
folios of businesses, is the focus of this research.
From the earlier development of the concept of strategy, research
emphasis shifted to the process of managing strategy in organizations
(Ansoff, DeClerck and Hayes, 1976; Schendel and Hofer, 1979). We have
*Business-level strategy addresses the question of how to compete
in a business, while corporate strategy focuses on which businesses to
compete in and on how to integrate them at the corporate level (Schendel
and Hofer, 1979:12).
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focused this research on those phases of the scraCegic nianagenienC pro-
cess involviag the choice of sCraCegy (and Che process of making Chose
decisions) and have largely excluded decisions regarding implementation
,
monitoring, and evaluation of such strategic decisions. At the present
stage of research on Che divestment topic, it seems important to im-
prove our understanding of and base for evaluation of the strategic
choices being made before proceeding to study the implementation of and
results of those choices.
Life Cycles and Related Concepts
The concept of life cycles has been addressed by many researchers
in its application to the management of particular products, product
lines and industries over time. More recently, product life cycle
notions are being extended to a broader theory of market evolution,
shifting the focus from particular products to markets for generic
needs (Biggadike, 1981). In addition to being useful for the study and
management of products and industries, the life cycle concept has been
applied to firms (James, 1974). Although there is some difficulty
applying this notion to highly diversified firms with many products at
different life cycle stages and determining an overall corporate
stage, it emphasizes the potential usefulness of product life cycle
considerations in managing shifts in corporate portfolios of diverse
businesses.
Research efforts somewhat related to life cycle concepts include
Schendel and Patton's (1976) work on turnaround strategies and
Harrigan's (1979) work on endgame strategies. Schendel and Patton
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conclude that axtrsmely poor perforaianca, sharply declining stagnation,
is needed to "spur (the firoi) to action" (1976:240). We can extend
this to the hypothesis that very poor perfonaance could influence a
fimt toward divestment. Secondly, they suggest that turnaround of
firms in decline "usually requires substantial changes in the business"
(1976:240); divestment of a division or business unit is one such sub-
stantial change.
Harrigan (1979) offers alternative "endgame strategies" for the
profitable management of decline-phase businesses and supports the need
for more systematic use of divestment as well as of other endgame alter-
natives. She considers which strategies are appropriate for different
firms' situations. That some firms can proactlvely choose and imple-
ment those appropriate strategies while others cannot suggests that
other factors are influencing the endgame (including divestment) choice
process in firms.
Stages of Corporate Development
Thain (1969), Salter (1970), Scott (1971, 1973), Grant (1972), and
Greiner (1972) have proposed that corporations develop over time
through a series of stages. The contribution of the stages of corpor-
ate development literature to this research lies in its guidelines for
later-stage firms; this research is concerned with divestment of
divisions or other whole business units, thus it focusses on large,
diversified, divisionalized ("Stage III") firms. Characterization of
"Stage III" firms as having each division in competition (with other
divisions) for resources suggests that interdependency among businesses
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of a firm may influence :he fim's strategic choices regarding invest-
ment or divestment of various businesses. Similarly, performance
measurement of individuals in most Stage III companies is based on
external market criteria such as return on investment and market share
and control of organizational sub-units is based on analyses of finan-
cial results, suggesting that assessment of units' performance versus
their plans may influence divestment decisions of such firms.
Corporate Portfolio Theory
Building on the finance theory literature, researchers have been
developing theories about the design and management of corporate port-
folios of businesses. Particular attention has been given to indi-
vidual aspects of corporate portfolio building and dismantling, such as
diversification, acquisition, and divestment. Traditionally, both
researchers and corporate managers have placed significantly greater
emphasis on the expansion or acquisition aspects of corporate business
portfolio management. As corporate portfolio management activity has
shifted from the acquisition trends of the late 1960's to greater fre-
quency of divestment in the mid-1970' s, research emphasis has begun to
follow.
The stream of research to which Wrigley (1970) and Rumelt (197A)
were important contributors suggests that classification schemes based
on strategies of diversification offer useful insights into the manage-
ment of firms' shifts in their diversified portfolios of businesses.
The writings of Williamson (1975) and Dundas and Richardson (1980) sug-
gest to us that using degree and type of relatedness among business
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units as a research basis for grouping firms may explain some differ-
ences in the strategic -nanageaenc of corporate business portfolios.
The vrork of these researchers suggests that management of firms differs
according to the kind of "market failures" the firms are attempting to
bridge.
Research on acquisition's role in corporate portfolio theory has
also contributed to the conceptual foundation of our research on divest-
ment. Kitching's (1967) study of merger and acquisition strategies
suggests that the kind of relatedness which vertical and horizontal
acquisitions creates among units of firms may influence those firms'
divestment decisions. Salter and Weinhold (1979) describe the benefits
to be realized from an organization's unrelated diversifying acquisi-
tions as primarily financial in nature, such as growth in total firm
profits by cross-subsidization of businesses (1979:145). This suggests
that financial considerations, such as units' continued ability to con-
tribute to firms' total profits and thus to that cross-subsidization,
may be an important influence on firms' decisions to divest unrelated
units. The same factor may influence decisions of firms pursuing
financial rather than operating strategic relationships to divest low-
profit units. Eliasson (1976) discusses the impact of "tradition" on
firms' planning activities and on their failures to leave long-
established markets. This suggests that factors such as relationships
between units of firms and those firms' historical businesses may be
important influences on the firms' divestment decisions, as would be
relationships between decision-makers and the established businesses of
those firms.
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Dlvestment Literatura
Empirical research on corporate divesC-.nenc of businesses is quite
limited. Prior research from which this study extends includes
Gilmour's (1973) thesis, Porter's (1976) work on exit barriers, Patton
and Duhaime's (1978) survey of di/estment activity of large industrial
firms, and Nees' (1981) study of managers' roles in divestment. These
previous studies suggest that various behavioral, structural and
economic factors also influence divestment decision-making, thus pro-
viding a basis for additional hypotheses in this research.
Gilmour's (1973) research suggests that behavioral factors are
important influences on the divestment decision process. Studying
major divestment decisions in three medium to very large firms, he
found that a change or replacement of top management personnel preceded
the firm's decision to divest in each case he examined. That top
management replacement was a common factor in otherwise different sit-
uations suggests that top management's psychological distance or de-
tachment from divestment candidate units is a necessary condition for
firms to be willing to divest and thus for firms to make proactive use
of the divestment option. Nees' (1981) work lends further support to
the notion that behavioral factors are key influences on divestment
decision-making. Her study of division managers' roles in fourteen
divestments concludes that the divestment process is improved by in-
clusion of the division manager; implicit is the assumption that top
managers have the detachment Gilmour found necessary for them to ini-
tiate the divestment decision process.
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Porter (1976) askad why some businesses aarning "chronically
insufficienc" returns are not di'/esced by their parent firms, and sug-
gested that "barriers to exit" stand in the way of some divestment de-
cisions. Using PIMS data, Porter tested for the presence of structural
or economic, corporate strategy, and managerial barriers, and found
such exit barrier measures to be important predictors of non-divestment
of unprofitable businesses.
Patton and Duhaime (1978) surveyed large industrial corporations to
assess their recent divestment activity. Studying both firms' attitudes
toward the divestment option and the details of those firms' actual re-
cent divestments, they focused on the organizational decision-making
process and on changing motivations for corporate use of the divestment
option. Discrepancies were found between stated intentions of firms
and those firms' reported actions. Many firms claimed a proactive
attitude toward divestment but exhibited defensive actions with respect
to use of divestment; this suggests that other factors are preventing
firms from behaving as proactively and systematically as they are
thinking. The Patton and Duhaime results suggest hypotheses for this
research. For example, divested units' positions relative to their
firms' performance suggests that unit strength is an influencing
factor. The fact that so many divested units have deteriorated to
unprofitability, together with the fact that lower level managers so
often had no involvement in divestment decisions despite the degree of
decentralization of their firms, suggests that personal attachments to
units may r.nfluence divestment decision-making, preventing earlier,
more timely decisions.
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Several handbook.3 on dives Caienc have beep» vritten co guide managers
through Irapleraentation of divestment decisions (Lovejoy, 1971; Vignola,
1974; Bing, 1978); these served to articulate some of the "conventional
management wisdom" underlying some hypotheses of this research.
Vignola's writing, based in part on field research, supports the popular
notion that the performance (generally, the unfavorable performance) of
firms' units is the primary factor in the divestment decisions of firms.
Examples of profitable unit divestments, however, suggest that in at
least some situations the "unit performance" factor is dominated by
other influences on the divestment decision process. Vignola also dis-
cusses what he calls the "product line delineation problem" for divest-
ment, suggesting the importance of interdependency as a factor in
divestment decisions. The role of corporate financial position as a
factor in divestment decisions is supported by Lovejoy. He suggests
that the desperate need for cash to avoid bankruptcy is a motive for
some firms to divest profitable parts of those firms.
RESEARCH VARIABLES, HYPOTHESES AND METHODS
Research questions addressed by this study include:
- Are there significant differences among business units chosen
for divestment with respect to the financial conditions of those
units? With respect to the units' competitive positions?
- How do firms' financial positions and conditions in the general
economic environment affect decisions to divest business units?
- Do firms divest units which are highly interdependent with other
firm units, and, if so, under 'rfhat conditions?
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- How do historical commitmenCs of divesCnient decision-makers Co
particular units affect decisions to divest those units?
Variables
The objective of the research was to study the effects of various
factors hypothesized to be important influences on the divestment de-
cisions of large, diversified firms. Based on a review of the research
literature, the many articles appearing in the contemporary business
press, and our past research on divestment, the following factors were
hypothesized to be individually important influences on the divestment
decisions of such firms:
1) financial strength of the firm,
2) competitive and economic strength of the unit,
3) interdependencies among the unit and the firm's other
businesses,
4) general economic environment in which firm and unit are
operating, and
5) attachment between unit and divestment decision-maker.
The above factors are included in the following hypotheses which in
turn are summarized in Figure 1.
Insert Figure 1 About Here
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Hypotheses*
HI: Financial posinions of divesting firTns '^11 differ sig-
nificantly and unfavorably from financial positions of their
competitor groups,
HIA: ROE in the year preceding a divestment decision will
be lower for divesting firms than for the average of
their competitor groups.
H2: Recent financial positions of divesting firms will differ
significantly and unfavorably from prior financial positions of
those firms.
H2A: ROE for the year preceding a divestment decision will
be lower than ROE averaged for the three prior years.
H2B: Debt/equity ratio for the year preceding a divestment
decision will be higher than debt/equity ratio aver-
aged for the three prior years.
H2C: Dividends paid as a percent of earnings for the year
preceding a divestment decision will be lower than
dividends paid as a percent of earnings averaged for
the three prior years.
H3: Divested units will be characterized by low financial strength.
H3A: In the year before the divestment decision, performance
of divested units will be less satisfactory than per-
formance of firms' other units.
H3B: In the three years before the divestment decision, actual
performance will be less than planned performance.
H3C: In the year before the divestment decision, performance
expected from divested units will be less satisfactory
than performance expected from firms' alternative re-
source uses.
H3D: Profit growth rates of divested units will compare un-
favorably to those of their firms.
H3E: Contributions of divested units to firm profits will be
at unacceptably low (or negative) levels.
H4: Divested units will exhibit certain characteristics associated
with lack of strength.
H4A: Sales growth rates of divested units will compare un-
favorably to those of their firms.
H4B: Projected resource needs of divested units will be un-
acceptably high.
H4C: Divested units will be minor factors in their Industries
rather than major competitors.
H4D: Divested units will be less autonomous than other units
of firms.
*These hypotheses address the direct relationships between individual
factors and decisions to divest. In addition, a number of hypotheses
about relationships among the factors were tested but are not within the
focus of this article. Taose results, available in Duhairae (1981), were
generally not statistically significant.
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H5: Divested uni::3 w-ill be characterized by low interdependency
with other units of the fims.
H5A; Divested units will be characterized by low transfer of
technology to other units of their firms.
H5B: Divested units will be characterized by a low proportion
of plant and equipment shared with other units of their
firms.
H5C: Divested units will be characterized by a low proportion
of sales to customers of their firms' other units.
H5D: Divested units will be characterized by a low proportion
of interfirm sales.
H5E: Divested units will be characterized by a low proportion
of interfirm purchases.
H6: Decisions to divest units are usually made in contraction
rather than expansion phases of the general economic cycle.
H7: Divested units will be characterized by low managerial at-
tachment.
Methodology
Field research methods, using personal interviewing, were appro-
priate for this study for several reasons. Little is published or
available in public records about the details of firms' divestment
decision processes. Divestment is a highly sensitive and confidential
topic for most firms because of its historical association with fail-
ure and the fact that it reflects firms' strategic choices and might
be used as an indicator of future strategic directions. More generally,
the exploratory stage of divestment research made the breadth and rich-
ness of information available through field study very desirable. Data
on some variables, such as "firm financial strength" and "general eco-
nomic environment growth," were collected from public sources, but most
data were obtained through personal interviews.
Semi-structured personal interviews were conducted by the researcher
with persons familiar with recent divestment decisions and factors in-
fluencing them in forty (40) "Fortune 500" firms. Actual divestments
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of business units made by the flms (or in progress) were discussed,
focusing on Che divescmenc decis ton-making process and on factors in-
fluencing that process. Interviewees' positions ranged from Manager to
President, but most were Vice Presidents, generally of Planning or
Corporate Development. A seventy-fi/e item questionnaire was completed
by the researcher for each interviewee during and immediately after the
interview. ' ' ' •
The primary criteria for selection of firms for the research sample
were size, geographical location, divestment activity, and divestment
discretion. More specifically, firms were included in the sample if
they:
1) were among the 1979 "Fortune 500" Industrials (thus a large,
industrial, U.S. -based corporation) and were diversified and
divislonalized (thus comprised of distinguishable business
units)
;
2) were headquartered in or near Chicago, Cleveland, New York City
or Pittsburgh (thus accessible for personal interviews within
the financial constraints of the research);
3) had divested at least one business unit during the period 1975-
1980 which was considered significant by the firm and which was
at the firm's discretion ( not ordered by anti-trust litigation).
Although financial constraints and the use of personal interviewing
limited the sample geographically, that limitation did not seem to
seriously bias the research results. Firms headquartered in those four
cities constitute 20% of the 1979 "Fortune 500." A potential sample of
seventy-five firms met the research criteria of size, geographical
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locatlon, and recent divestment activity. Of those, forty firms agreed
to participate and were able to do so within tne time frame for this
project.
Although efforts were made to minimize biases and other adverse
effects stemming from the choice of research methods, some limitations
are inherent in every available choice. Reliance on firms themselves
for information may sacrifice some standardization available from re-
quired public disclosure documents, yet such an approach is necessary
when the appropriate information is not publicly available, as in the
case of variables such as "unit strength." Personal interviewing in-
evitably has some limitations as a data collection method. The most
important of these are researcher bias, time distortion, interviewee
bias, and the high financial and time cost of collecting data.
Standardizing the interviews across the sample (as much as possible
while maintaining the semi-structured approach appropriate to the or-
ganizational level interviewed) served to minimize researcher bias.
Time distortion problems were reduced by selecting for discussion that
divestment (from among those the firm had made in the time period) with
which the interviewee felt most familiar. Interviewee bias was at
least partially controlled by questions posed as probes during the
interview; the opportunity to interject probes is an important advan-
tage of the interview method.
Nonparametric statistical methods were used in testing the hypothe-
ses of this study. In addition, qualitative analysis of the interview
data was undertaken. The rich data base, consisting of first-hand,
in-depth descriptions given by forty corporate executives of their
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imporCant strategic decisions and the Influences on those decisions, is
an important asset of this resear':h. Conclusions drawn from this
research ara strengthened by the z^cz that data were collected through
personal interviews with high-level executives of these large firms,
for previous research has indicated that it is at those upper manage-
ment levels that divestment decisions are made (Gilmour, 1973; Patton
and Duhairae, 1978).
RESULTS
Two types of results from this research have been developed. Sta-
tistical tests of the hypotheses are emphasized here; findings ob-
tained from qualitative analysis of the interview data will be deve-
loped more fully in future articles. The research results suggest
that strong relationships exist between divestment decision-making and
several of the factors hypothesized to influence those decisions. For
other factors, the relationship is weak, and, for a few cases, the
relationship is in the direction opposite that hypothesized. As many
of the hypotheses are consistent with both conventional management
wisdom and related literature, these are Interesting and somewhat pro-
vocative results. Table 1 summarizes the hypotheses and the primary
results.
Insert Table 1 about here
Firm Financial Strength (HI, H2)
The study hypothesized that divestment decisions would be made in
situations of low firm financial strength rather than high.* It is
*The bases for classifying fims and units as "high" or "low" on
each variable are explained in the Appendix.
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reasonable to expect Chat firm-level financial considerations would
affect firms' discretion in making divestment decisions. Published
statistics of firms' financial positions and performance are available
to stockholders and creditors of firms as indicators of firms' finan-
cial strength or weakness. Pressure on firms to divest can result when
these statistics are unfavorable relative to the firms' own past per-
formance, to competitors' current performance, or to conditions in the
general economy.
This research, studying large, publicly-held firms, used statistics
from Standard and Poor's Industry Surveys to test these hypotheses.
The nffiasures of firm financial strength selected for use in this re-
search were:
1) return on equity (ROE)
2) debt/equity ratio (DE), and
3) dividends paid as a percent of earnings (DIVPAY).
Results . Firm financial strength by comparison to industry average
appears to be a strong influence on divestment decision-making (HI).
The research results give strong support to the hypothesis that divest-
ment decisions tend to be made when firm financial strength, as mea-
sured by ROE, is low by comparison to industry financial strength.*
*The "industry financial strength" to which a particular firm's
financial strength is compared is calculated as follows. The industry
and industry sub-group (e.g.. Automobiles—Original Equipment Manufac-
turers) in which the firm is classified in Standard and Poors Industry
Surveys is identified. The subgroup's average return on equity (ROE),
not including the firm, is calculated for the year before the firm's
divestment decision. This industry average is then compared to the
firm's ROE for the same year.
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Nearly Chree-quarcers oi "he decisioas Co divest units were made at
times when the ROE of :he divesting firms compared unfavorably with
those of their industries (X" = 12.789, a = .001).
It is somewhat surprising, however, to find that firm financial
strength judged by other traditional measures is not significantly
related to divestment decisions (HZ"*
,
despite the hypotheses' strong
base in conventional management wisdom. Firm financial strength
(f inn's present record compared to its own prior record) was tested in
three parts, using as measures: a) return on equity (ROE), b)
debt/equity ratio (DE) , and c) dividends paid as a percent of earnings
(DIVPAY). Data from Standard & Poor's Industry Surveys did not show a
significant majority of firms' financial positions to be low at the
time of divestment using any of these measures. In fact, a slight
majority of the divestments studied were decided under conditions of
high firm financial strength (relative to firms' prior records),
although that higher frequency was not statistically significant.
A composite measure, "OVERALL FIRM FINANCIAL STRENGTH-INTERVIEW,"
is drawn from the interview data, specifically items dealing with
firms' debt/equity, dividend policy and stock price positions, avail-
ability of firms' resources for unit and other needs, and probable
conditions for non-divestment decisions. The frequency of "low" over-
all firm financial strength in the research sample was greater than
that of "high," as hypothesized. However, the difference was not
statistically significant.
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Summarizing, we can say that the research supports the idea that a
relation exists between divestment decisions and low financial strength
of firms in comparison to their industry groups, but does not support
the existence of a relation between divestment decisions and financial
strength of firms in comparison to their own prior records.
Unit Strength (H3, H4)
The strength of business units of firms has been hypothesized to be
related to firms' decisions to divest those units. We expected that
divested units would be characterized by low unit strength rather than
high. Unit strength has two facets of interest in this research: finan-
cial strength and competitive strength. Firms' managers' assessments
of units' competitive positions and of their performance compared to
that of other units, to that planned, and to that of alternative re-
source resource uses, were collected in the research interviews and
used as measures of unit strength.
Results . Unit strength was found to be strongly related to divestment
decision-making. Both unit competitive strength and unit financial
strength, except when measured by units' actual versus planned perfor-
mance, showed statistically significant results that decisions are
associated with low strength units.* That divested unit strength was
low was clearly an expected result of this study; the contribution of
this research with respect to this variable is in refining our defini-
tion of "low unit strength." Rather than being limited to the tradi-
tional definition of low strength as lack, of profitability, this study
9
*X'' = 28.49, a = .001; binomial test, a = .0002; respectively.
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dif ferentiated among i number of aai" sCrengch measures and Cested the
relation of each to divestment decision-making.
Comparing divested unit performance to that of their firms' other
units, only 7% of divested units were said to "perform better than most
other units," while Tuore than three-quarters were described as perform-
ing worse than most. The distribution of divested units' performance
compared to that expected from firms' alternative resource uses was as
hypothesized. As might be expected because divestments forced by
government regulation were excluded from this research, there were no
instances of units divested whose performance was better than that
expected from alternatives; the frequency of "unit worse than alterna-
tives" was much greater than that of "unit same as alternatives."
Similarly, profit growth rates of the divested units generally com-
pared unfavorably to those of their firms, as did the units' sales
growth rates. Divested units' contributions to their firms' profit-
ability at the time of the divestment decision were characterized in
only 16% of the cases as acceptable; 40% of the units were sustaining
losses, and 44% were profitable, but at unacceptably low levels.
Divested units' projected resource needs provide a firm-specific
measure of unit strength. That is, a unit might require greater future
resources than its parent firm is positioned to provide, and thus be
perceived within that firm as a low strength unit. The same unit in
a cash-rich firm might be perceived more favorably. More than three-
quarters of the divested units studied were "low strength" by the
resource needs measure (that is, their projected resource needs were
unacceptably high for their parent firms).
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Unit competitive strength, indicated by firms' managers' assess-
ments of divested units' positions as major or minor factors in their
industries, was similarly found to be low, as hypothesized. I-Iore than
three-quarters of the units were characterized as minor competitors in
their industries.
Divested units were seldom described as less autonomous than firms'
other units, and 40% of divested units were said to be more autonomous
than firms' other units. Perhaps this result could be expected since
more than 25% of the sample units were described as being "too small"
relative to the firm. As a result, they were felt to require a dis-
proportionately large commitment of top management time if they were
to be retained in the firm's portfolio of businesses.
Unit Interdependency (H5)
Certain characteristics of firms and their units have been sug-
gested in the literature as creating barriers to exit (through highly
interdependent relationships among units) . Interdependencies between
divestment candidate units and firms' other business units were there-
fore hypothesized to be influences on firms' decisions to divest those
units. The personal interviews with firms' managers provided data to
test our hypotheses about interdependency.
Results . The data strongly supported our hypotheses that divested
units are likely to show little interdependency with their firms' other
2
units (X = 7.47, a = .01), consistent with Porter's work on exit
barriers (1976). We expected that high levels of sharing of technology,
facilities, and customers among units of firms would act as barriers to
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firras' exics from those unics. We therefore hypothesized that divested
units would be characterized by little or no sharing of technology with
their firms' other units (more than 90% of the studied units were so
described), a low proportion of plant and equipment shared with other
units (nearly 90% of our units shared less than 10% of their P&E), and
a low proportion of their sales to customers of their firms' other
units (again, nearly 90% of the units were classified as "low," having
less than 25% of their sales to shared customers). Interfirm purchases
and interfirm sales, other barriers to exit suggested by Porter, were
found in less than 25% of the studied units, and represented a large
proportion of the unit's transactions in less than 5% of our cases.
Thus, using a number of measures of unit interdependency , divested
units were generally found to have little interdependency with their
firms' other units. This has important implications for corporate
acquisition decision-making and for business portfolio composition.
In addition, a number of hypotheses were tested in an attempt to
explain why firms which _do divest high interdependency units and high
strength units might choose to divest such units.* It is interesting
that of the various hypotheses which attempted to explain high strength
and high interdependency divestments in terms of the other variables of
this study, none were supported by the data. This lends indirect
support to other "strategic" explanations the interviewees gave for
such divestments.
*See DuhaLme (1981) for a full discussion of these hypotheses and
their results.
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General Economic Envircnjent Growth (H6)
The "general econoolc environmenc growth" variable reflects the
general external economic conditions within which the firm and its
units were operating at the time of divestment. General economic con-
ditions affect firms' decision-making through differences in avail-
ability and cost of credit, demand for goods and services, and result-
ing price levels for raw materials and finished goods. At the extreme
(severe recession or depression), this variable alone could force a
divestment decision (divestment as a form of financing). We expected
that divestment decisions would be made in contraction rather than
expansion phases of the general economic cycle. General economic con-
ditions at the time of each divestment decision were classified by the
researcher as expansion or contraction according to guidelines of the
National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) , widely used for differen-
tiating economic cycle stages.
Results . The data do not support the hypothesis that divestment
decision-making is related to economic cycle phase. Using both the
chi-square and the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test, no significant differences
in divestment decision frequency are found among the economic cycle
phases.
A limitation of the chosen research methodology is obvious here:
we can draw conclusions about timing of divestment decisions only on
the basis of decisions to divest . A better test of this hypothesis
would include all divestment decision-making activity within a firm
over the 1975-1980 period and observe the relative proportion of
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"divesC" and "don't divesc" decisions in the various economic cycle
stages; this was not possible within the confines of the current re-
search. Further, we suspect that participant cooperation would, for
confidentiality reasons, be very difficult to obtain for a study which
included business units once considered for divestment but still part
of firms' portfolios.
Managerial Attachment (H7)
The "managerial attachment" variable measures the degree and nature
of relationships between divestment decision—makers and business units
which are divestment candidates. The greater the involvement with a
unit and attachment to a unit which senior managers have, the less
likely it is that those managers will be able to objectively consider
that unit's divestment. We expected, therefore, that divested units
would be characterized by low levels of managerial attachment.
Measurement of this variable is unit-specific: the managerial
attachment of research interest is that to a particular unit under
consideration for divestment. The manager whose attachment to that
unit is of most interest is the Chief Executive Officer (CEO).* The
personal interviews with firms' managers provided data to test our
hypotheses about managerial attachment.
*Some reasons for choice of CEO as subject of the managerial at-
tachment measure are: 1) divestment of whole business units is a
corporate-level strategic decision appropriate for that position; 2)
Gilmour's research (1973) found divestment decision-making to be located
at uppermost management levels (executive vice-president to Board of
Directors, depending on size of firm and attachment of the CEO); 3)
Allen's research (1979) found CEO tenure to be a significant influence
on organizational restructuring decisions, which are related at least
indirectly to divestment decisions.
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Results . The research res-alts do not offer significant support for the
hypothesis that divested units are characterized by low managerial
attachment. Although the frequency of "low" managerial attachment to
divested units is greater than that of "high" managerial attachment,
using the chi-square statistic we conclude that the observed difference
is not significant.
•
^
-• DISCUSSION
The research results offer strong support for some of the origi-
nal hypothesized influences on decisions to divest business units,
indicating that those factors are indeed related in the hypothesized
direction to those decisions. Unit strength and unit interdependency
are two such influences. We hypothesized that units which firms decided
to divest were likely to be low strength, similarly that those units
were likely to have low interdependency with their firms' other units;
those hypotheses found strong support in the data.
Firm financial strength was hypothesized to influence divestment
decision-making; a number of measures of firm financial strength were
used, with mixed results. The data showed that divestment decisions
were generally made when firms' performance levels were below those of
their industries. Based on this result and on interviewees' supporting
comments, together with the concern interviewees spoke of regarding
firms' stock prices and price/earnings multiples being lower than their
competitors', we conclude that firms' comparisons of themselves with
their competitors is an important influence on their decisions to divest
business units. Tests comparing firms' performance to their own prior
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performance all showed iistribucions with more "high-strength" than
"low-strength" incidents, although the results were not statistically
significant. We can speculate that some firms delay divestment deci-
sions, especially those involving "low strength" units which may mean
a selling loss for the firm, until a "good" year (high firm financial
strength), when the firm can better afford to take that divestment
loss. This would be consistent 'vith firms' concerns about the effects
of their actions (including divestment) on their stock prices.
Our hypothesis that divestment decisions would generally be made
not in economic expansion but in economic contraction was not supported
by the data; the distribution was in the direction opposite that hy-
pothesized, but the difference was not statistically significant. Addi-
tional insights were gained from interviewees' comments: they char-
acterized stages of the economic cycle as short-term conditions, not
the basis for long-term decisions such as divestment and other port-
folio shifts. It is interesting to note that some of the divestment
decisions made during economic contraction involved high strength, low
interdependency units; the high price of funds (because of economic
conditions) for alternative resource uses influenced firms to divest
those low interdependency units although they were still profitable.
Our hypothesis that decisions to divest would usually involve units
to which managerial attachment was low was only weakly supported. More
instances of low managerial attachment than high were reported, but the
difference was not statistically significant. There are several possible
explanations for the weak results on the managerial attachment variable.
Although managerial attachment has support in the literature as a
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barrier to divestment, it is not presumed to be a permanent or impene-
trable barrier; eventually other pressures (such as low fiirm financial
strength or poor unit performance) arise in a unit's situation which
either override high levels of managerial attachment or force replace-
ment of the manager in question, thus changing the level of managerial
attachment. That a unit had little interdependency with the firm's
other units, on the other hand, would probably not be enough to over-
come managerial attachment and result in a divestment decision.
The research findings are important for management policymakers.
To the extent that managers can improve their understanding of the
influences on others ' past divestment decisions and can increase
their awareness of the divestment-influencing factors, they may be
better able to assess the presence of those factors in their own
management arenas. They could then take positive steps, through
informal awareness or through formal management systems, to protect
against any detrimental effects those factors might have on their
decision-making processes.
More specifically, the influence that some of the above factors
were reported to have on divestment decisions indicate that it would be
appropriate for managers to explicitly consider those factors in the
design of their formal management systems. The research results also
suggest that firms should (especially at the time of acquisition con-
sideration) explicitly recognize the tradeoff between the benefits of
interdependencies and the undesirable effects of greater cyclicality in
those portfolios. By systematically including that tradeoff in their
acquisition considerations, firms would be able to achieve a better
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balance between chose alaTnencs racher Chan having Co later correcC to
such a balance.
This study's contribution to Che advancement of research on cor-
porate business porcfolij manageaienc is significant. Empirical
research on corporate divestment has been very limited; the relatively
large scale of our investigation and Che diversity of divesting firms
and divested units studied broadens the base for future research. The
hypothesized influencing factors were supported by conventional manage-
ment wisdom; this research was the first effort to systematically con-
firm (and, as in the case of firm financial strength by comparison to
prior strength, fail to confirm) Chose factors' influences on the
divestment decision-making process over a broad cross-section of divest-
ment Instances.
The prominence of acquisition-related issues in the interview
discussions has important implications for policy researchers. It
appears that more cooperation and coordination of these two research
streams is appropriate. Although research has been more extensive on
acquisitions than on divestments, additional study in the area of acqui-
sitions is needed, specifically on the formulation rather than imple-
mentation of appropriate acquisition strategies. The results of this
study indicate that many divested units (subsequently falling into our
"low unit strength" and "low interdependency" categories) should not
have been acquired by their parent firms.
CONCLUSION
The purpose of this research has been to improve our understanding
of firms' decisions to divest business units of themselves. Certain
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factors were hypochesized to be "he major determinants of divestment
decisions; three of these were found to be significant: unit strength,
unit interdependency , and firm financial strength relative to industry
averages (see Figure 2). Other important insights about the divestment
decision process were gained through use of personal interviewing as
the data collection method.
Insert Figure 2 about here
The subject of this research is critically important to corporate
managers, as evidenced by the relatively high response rate (willing-
ness to participate) we obtained on this sensitive and confidential
topic. With greater knowledge of divestment-influencing factors, firms
can design their management systems to better manage the divestment
option.
Many fruitful directions for future research are suggested by our
findings. First, now that this research has identified important indi-
vidually influencing factors, further study of those factors should
determine their relative impacts on the divestment decision process.
Also, research samples could be selected focusing on combinations of
those factors to study their interrelationships. This promises to be a
fruitful area for research. This study focused on individual instances
of divestment by firms; it necessarily excluded, therefore, study of
the influence which firms' patterns of divestment, acquisition and
portfolio construction activities might have on those firms' subsequent
divestment decisions, another promising area for future research. As
noted earlier, future research efforts including units not divested by
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firras would probably be aseful, despite Che difficulty of arranging
such a study.
Finally, and perhaps ^ost imporcantly , the link between divestment
decision-making, divescment decision implementation, and firm perfor-
mance promises to be a fartlle and important area for future research
efforts. Empirically-developed prescriptions for corporate managers
resulting from such research would be of great value.
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Figure 1
Hypothesizad Direct Relationships of Influenciag
Variables and Divestment Decisions
HI,* H2:
FIRM FINANCIAL STRENGTH
(low, high)
H3, H4:
UNIT STRENGTH
(low, high)
H5:
UNIT INTERDEPENDENCY
(low, high)
H6:
GENERAL ECONOMIC GROWTH
(contraction, expansion)
H7:
MANAGERIAL ATTACHMENT
(low, high)
DECISION
TO
DIVEST
*Note: HI and related designations
refer to the hypotheses
developed for the research.
Figure 2
Resulting Direct Relationships of Influencing
Variables and Divestment Decisions*
HI;
FIRM FINANCIAL STRENGTH
(firm ROE below industry's average ROE,
firm ROE at/above industry's average ROE)
H3, H4:
UNIT STRENGTH
(low, high)
(.001)
H5:
UNIT INTERDEPENDENCY
(low, high)
DECISION
TO
DIVEST
*Significance levels shown in parentheses.
Table 1
Summary of Results of Hypothesis Testing
Significant Support
HI: Financial positions of divesting firms will differ significantly
and unfavorably from financial positions of their competitor groups.
Results : Supported at the a = .001 level.
H3: Divested units ..rLli be characterized by low financial strength.
Results : Supported at the a = .001 level. Distributions using
different measures of unit financial strength were all in the
hypothesized dir-jction; all but unit performance compared to its
planned performance were significant at the a = .01 or a = .001
levels.
H4: Divested units will exhibit certain characteristics associated
with lack of strength.
Results ; Supported at the a = .001 level. Distributions of
units' sales growth rates, projected resource needs, and competi-
tive strength were all in the hypothesized direction. Distribu-
tion of units' autonomy was in the direction opposite hypothe-
sized.
H5: Divested units will be characterized by low interdependency with
other units of the firms.
Results : Supported at the a = .01 level. Distributions of units'
shared technology, shared facilities, shared customers, interfirm
sales, and interfirm purchases were all in the hypothesized
direction, and were significant at the a = .001 level.
Weak Support
H7 : Divested units will be characterized by low managerial attach-
ment.
Results : Distribution was in the hypothesized direction, but not
significant.
Mixed Results
H2: Recent financial positions of divesting firms will differ sig-
nificantly and unfavorably from prior financial positions of those
firms.
Results : Distributions of firm financial strength measured by
return on equity, debt/equity ratio, and dividends paid as a
percent of earnings all were in the direction opposite hypothe-
sized, but not significant.
H6: Decisions to divest units are usually made in contraction rather
than expansion phases of the general economic cycle.
Results : Distribution was in the direction opposite hypothesized,
but not significant.
Appendix
Classification of Factors as ^ILgh/Low
Firm Financial Strength
Return on equity (ROE) versus prior ROE was HIGH strength if the firm's
ROE in the year preceding the divestment decision was greater than or
equal to its average ROS for the three prior years, LOW strength other-
wise.
Debt/equity ratio (DE) versus prior DE was HIGH strength if the firm's
DE in the year preceding the divestment decision was less than or equal
to its average DE for the three prior years, LOW strength otherwise.
Dividends paid as a percent of earnings (DIVPAY) versus prior DIVPAY
was HIGH strength if the firm's DIVPAY in the year preceding the divest-
ment decision was less than or equal to its average DIVPAY for the three
prior years, LOW strength otherwise.
Return on equity (ROE) versus industry's average ROE was HIGH strength
if the firm's ROE in the year preceding the divestment decision was
greater than or equal to its industry's average ROE, LOW strength other-
wise.
Overall firm financial strength (public) was based on firm's four
measures above. Overall strength was HIGH if three or more measures
were HIGH and LOW if three or more measures were LOW. The remaining
cases were classified as HIGH or LOW by examining directions of trends
in the four-year data on the various measures.
Overall firm financial strength (interview) was based on interview data
about firms' debt/equity, dividend policy and stock price positions,
availability of firms' resources for xonit and other needs, and probable
conditions for non-divestment decisions. The researcher's judgment was
used to classify firms as HIGH or LOW using that data.
Unit Strength
Unit financial strength was classified as HIGH or LOW based on measures
of unit performance compared to performance of firms' other units (HIGH
if unit about average or better than most), unit performance compared
to planned performance (HIGH if on plan or better than plan), unit per-
formance compared to performance expected from firms' alternative
resource uses (HIGH if unit same as or better than alternatives), unit
profit growth rates compared to those of their firms (HIGH if unit same
as or better than firm), unit contribution to firm profit (HIGH if
acceptable profit contribution), unit sales growth rates compared to
those of their firms (HIGH if unit same as or better than firm) , and
projected resource needs of units (HIGH if acceptable to firm). In a
Appendix (continued)
limiCed number of cases, these '/arious measures gave conflicting signals
about oni: financial strength, in Jhich cases the researcher's judgment
vas exercised in classifying those cases as HIGH or LOW.
Unit competitive strength was HIGH if the unit was a major competitor
in its market, LOW otherwise (based on interview data).
Overall unit strength was based on units' financial strength and compe-
titive strength measures, with financial strength dominating.
Unit Interdependency
Overall unit interdependency was classified as HIGH or LOW based on
measures of shared technology (HIGH if more than little or none was
shared), shared plant and equipment (HIGH if 10% or more was shared),
unit's sales to shared customers (HIGH if 25% or more of unit's sales),
Interfirm purchases (HIGH if more than little or none), interfirm sales
(HIGH if more than little or none), and presence or absence of a ver-
tical integration relationship between the unit and others in the firm.
Unlike the multiple measures of unit financial strength, the measures
of unit interdependency are not required to move together for the
HIGH/LOW classification and, in fact, generally do not. Following
Porter, we say that any of the above conditions indicate HIGH (overall)
interdependency
.
General Economic Environment Growth
General economic environment growth was classified as EXPANSION if the
unit's divestment decision year was one of upturn to expansion or full
expansion according to the National Bureau of Economic Research,
CONTRACTION otherwise.
Managerial Attachment
Managerial attachment was classified as HIGH or LOW based on measures
of the divestment decision-maker's past responsibility for the unit
(HIGH attachment if "yes"), the importance of the unit to the divest-
ment decision-maker (HIGH attachment if unit represented a significant
proportion of the decision-maker's responsibility), the CEO's relation
to the unit (HIGH if CEO was involved in the unit's acquisition or
development), and CEO's tenure in the CEO position, in the firm, in the
unit, and in the unit's business (HIGH if more than two years in the
position or the unit, more than five years in the firm or the unit's
business). In some cases, these various measures gave conflicting
indications of managerial attachment; then researcher judgment was
exercised. Tne factors were not equally weighted; for example, if the
CEO's relation to the unit was that he was directly responsible for the
unit's acquisition, managerial attachment was classified as HIGH regard-
less of what indications the other measures gave.

%t^^i.



HECKMAN
BINDERY INC.
JUN95
, ^ „
. N. MANCHESTER,
,»,J.T<..Pk«?
INDIANA 46962
'

